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ABSTRACT
The law’s complexity is such that even apparently minor changes can have
numerous “ripple” effects. This Article examines the ripple effects from a
potential broadening of patent law’s definition of an infringing “offer to sell.”
Currently, courts limit “offers” to formal, contract-law offers; but a policy
analysis suggests that “offers” should include advertisements and other
promotions, which harm patentees via price erosion. Changing the offer
definition to include advertisements and other promotions requires a careful
consideration of the effects, including effects on patent litigation, innovation
incentives, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, third-party liability, and
Constitutional concerns. This Article performs that analysis and provides specific
recommendations for crafting the definition of an infringing “offer” to sell.
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INTRODUCTION
Small changes in the law can sometimes have large downstream
consequences. Such large consequences from small initial changes can be
called “butterfly effects,” a phrase associated with the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology meteorologist who described how small changes in initial
weather data may result in large differences in simulated weather conditions.1
Much like weather forecasting, small changes in the law can have butterfly-like

1. See Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI.
130 (1963).
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intended and unintended consequences.
This Article examines the likely consequences in a particular area of law
undergoing recent refinement—specifically, patent infringement based on an
“offer to sell.”2 While patent infringement for an offer to sell has been in the
law since 1996,3 it has received increased attention lately and is fast becoming
an important tool for patent holders seeking to protect themselves from wouldbe infringers of patented technology.4 In its 2010 decision in Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive
jurisdiction of patent appeals,6 announced that an offer to sell can be an act of
infringement even if the offer is made outside of the United States, as long as
the contemplated sale would have occurred in the United States.7 The potential
extraterritorial consequences of the Transocean opinion have generated much
discussion.8
In addition to recent judicial activity in the area, scholars have analyzed the
boundaries of infringement for an “offer to sell.”9 In an earlier work, I argued
that the Federal Circuit’s current standard for an infringing “offer” to sell—
namely, a formal contract-law offer—is sub-optimal from a policy
perspective.10 I advocated for a broader definition of an “offer,” which would
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Note that § 271(a) lists several acts that may constitute
infringement, including making, using, selling, or offering to sell patented technology. Each
act represents an independent occurrence of infringement. Thus, an offer to sell patented
technology can infringe even if no sale is ever consummated.
3. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (approving a treaty that required,
among other things, adding “offer to sell” as an independent ground of infringement).
4. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent
Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability
Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751 (2003) [hereinafter
Holbrook, Threat of a Sale]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After
Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2012) [hereinafter Holbrook, Transocean]; Melissa Y.
Lerner, You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct Infringement and the
Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207
(2011); Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An “Offer to Sell” As A Policy Tool in
Patent Law and Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143 (2013) [hereinafter Osborn, Offer as
a Policy Tool]; Rex W. Miller, II, Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement:
Why Economic Interests Rather Than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO
ST. L.J. 403, 442 (2009); Na Zhu, Patent Infringement Through Foreign Offer for Domestic
Sale: Transocean v. Maersk, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 566 (2012).
5. 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes
16-20, 24, 31-32 and accompanying text.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
7. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309.
8. See Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4; Lerner supra note 4; Miller, supra note
4; Zhu supra note 4.
9. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 764-820; Osborn, Offer as a
Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 169-94.
10. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 172-80.
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include not only formal contract-law offers, but also most advertisements and
promotions.11 In that work, I demonstrated that the primary policy underlying
the prohibition of infringing “offers to sell,” which is to prevent a competitor
from generating commercial interest in infringing technology to the patentee’s
detriment,12 differs from the policies behind the contract-law definition of an
offer. I argued that this difference dictates interpreting the word “offer” to
include advertisements and promotions because they generally will harm the
patentee by causing price erosion.13
This Article picks up where my previous policy analysis left off, and
analyzes the probable real world effects of a change from a narrow contract-law
“offer” standard to a broader advertisements-and-promotion standard. To
understand the effects of this potential change, one must understand the
difference between the narrower and broader definitions of an “offer”
contrasted in this Article. The narrow contract law definition can be defined as
“the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and
will conclude it.”14 This definition generally excludes advertisements and other
promotions because they are not specific enough to warrant the recipient in
understanding that she is empowered to close the deal.15 On the other hand,
broadening the “offer” definition to include advertisements and promotions
would allow a patent holder to sue a competitor based solely on an
advertisement promoting an infringing device.
This Article’s analysis reveals not only the obvious intended consequences
of the broader “offer” definition, but also some dramatic butterfly-like
unintended consequences. More than simply identifying intended and
unintended consequences of the change, the Article shows courts and
lawmakers how to maximize beneficial consequences and minimize any
harmful ones.
After an overview of the current law governing an infringing offer to sell in
Part I, Part II of the Article discusses the most obvious effects of broadening
the definition of an infringing offer, such as more patent litigation and litigation
at an earlier time. Part III explores some less obvious ripple effects from the
proposed law change, including the potential for a vastly expanded
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. The upshot of this analysis is that
courts must be careful only to impose liability for infringing advertisements
that are likely to cause harm in the United States.
11. Id. at 173-94.
12. E.g., Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (citing 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc.,

160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
13. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173-76. For more about price
erosion, see infra notes 134136 and accompanying text.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
15. E.g., 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Joseph M. Perillo, ed.,
rev. ed. 1993).
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Part IV discusses the uncertainty that will accompany the proposed law
change, and suggests a carefully crafted definition of an “offer” that includes
advertisements and similar promotions, but excludes mere market
investigations. Market investigations are often necessary before a competitor
can decide whether to invest in a license to the patent or to attempt to design
around (avoid) it. To emphasize further how even small changes in the law
carry extended consequences, Part V briefly discusses some additional ripple
effects. Finally, Part VI concludes by summarizing the proposed changes and
tests developed throughout the Article.
I.

A $15,000,000 QUESTION: WHAT IS AN INFRINGING “OFFER”?

In 2006, Maersk A/S, a Danish shipping company, offered Statoil ASA, a
Norwegian oil company, the use of its offshore drilling rig for drilling in the
U.S. waters of the Gulf of Mexico.16 The rig cost hundreds of millions of
dollars to build17 and would cost the oil company about half-a-million dollars a
day to lease.18 Before the drilling rig reached U.S. waters and even before the
rig had finished being built (in Singapore), Transocean19 sued Maersk for
infringing its U.S. patents covering aspects of the drilling rig.20 How could
Maersk have infringed U.S. patents before it built, sold, or used anything in the
United States? The answer lies in a relatively new provision to U.S. patent law
that makes “offering to sell” a patented invention in the United States an act of
infringement.21

16. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1307.
17. The parties kept financial information filed under seal, but building cost estimates

of similar ultra-deepwater drilling rigs demonstrate the immense investment. See Press
Release, Maersk, Maersk Drilling Orders Ultra Deepwater Drillships (July 5, 2011),
available
at
http://www.maersk.com/press/newsandpressreleases/pages/20110705090137.aspx (reporting a “total project cost for . . . two drillships is approximately USD 1.3
billion”).
18. Again, the parties kept financial information filed under seal, but estimates of lease
rates for similar ultra-deepwater drilling rigs support this figure. See David Phillips, Cost of
Offshore Drilling Rising as Fast as Oil Prices, CBS MONEY WATCH (May 8, 2008, 3:35
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cost-of-offshore-drilling-rising-as-fast-as-oil-prices/
(reporting that the “daily rate that operators pay to rent a high-end, deep-water drilling rig is
now $500,000 to $550,000”); Marianne Stigset, Maersk Drilling Puts Oil Rig Fleet
Expansion on Hold as Build Costs Soar, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2011, 3:55 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-18/maersk-drilling-puts-rig-expansion-on-holdas-build-costs-soar.html (quoting Maersk’s CEO as saying that daily rental rates for ultradeepwater rigs have “had an average of about $450,000 for a while”).
19. Transocean has recently become a familiar name since one of its rigs, the
Deepwater Horizon, was involved in the explosion and subsequent oil spill on a project
overseen by British Petroleum (BP). See, e.g., Elizabeth Shogren, Panel Spreads Blame For
BP Oil Rig Explosion, NPR (Jan. 6, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/06/
132680706/panel-spreads-blame-for-bp-oil-rig-explosion.
20. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1300, 1311.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
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As part of the international harmonization of intellectual property laws
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(“TRIPS”),22 in 1994 Congress added a provision to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) making
an “offer to sell” infringing technology an independent act of patent
infringement.23 Before this amendment, a mere offer to sell would not infringe,
whereas an actual sale would.
Infringement based on an offer to sell initially did not generate an
abundance of attention, but that is changing as patent owners realize they can
obtain large monetary awards based on infringing offers. Recently, a jury found
Maersk’s offer to sell its rig infringed Transocean’s patents and awarded
Transocean $15,000,000.24 Thus, the question of what constitutes an “offer” to
sell represents a timely question. Uncertainty abounds in this area because
despite this radical change in the law, Congress gave no instruction about the
intent or meaning of the new language.25
The Federal Circuit has provided some contours of an infringing offer to
sell under § 271(a),26 and two of its cases are relevant to this Article’s analysis.
First, in Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,27 the Federal Circuit
concluded that it should “define § 271(a)’s ‘offer to sell’ liability according to
the norms of traditional contractual analysis.”28 Specifically, the court relied on
the definition of an offer in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.29 Second, in
Transocean,30 the Federal Circuit held that an offer to sell can be an act of
infringement even if the offer is made outside of the United States, as long as
the contemplated sale was to occur in the United States.31 The Transocean
22. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex
1C, art. 28, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3c_e.htm (“Article 28 . . . A patent shall
confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: . . . to prevent third parties not having the
owner’s consent from the acts of: . . . offering for sale.”).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever . . . offers to sell . . . within . . . the United States
any patented invention . . . infringes.”). The statute became effective January 1, 1996. See
also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (approving TRIPS).
24. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699
F.3d 1340, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing jury award). Although the trial court
vacated the verdict, the appeals court reinstated it. Id. at 1357-59.
25. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Unfortunately, other than stating that an ‘offer to sell’ includes only those offers ‘in which
the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent,’ Congress offered no other
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase . . . . [T]he legislative history of the statute offers
little additional insight.”) (citation omitted).
26. For a detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s case law on this subject, see
Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 195-99.
27. 215 F.3d 1246.
28. Id. at 1254-55.
29. Id. at 1257 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24).
30. 617 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
31. Id. at 1309. In this case, the offeror was based in United States but made the offer
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court also held that an infringing offer to sell may occur even if the device
offered for sale was not built when the offer was made.32
As mentioned above, in an earlier work I criticized the Rotec decision from
a policy perspective and argued that courts should broaden the definition an
“offer” to include not only contract-law offers, but also advertisements and
similar promotions.33 This Article takes the analysis further by analyzing the
practical effects of overruling the Rotec court’s narrow definition of an offer,34
including how such a change would interact with the Transocean court’s
extraterritorial reading of an “offer to sell.” Whereas my former article
discussed what the courts should do, this Article works through the practical
consequences and provides details for how the courts should do it.
As we consider the effects of changing the definition of an infringing offer,
one must keep in mind a fundamental tenet of proving patent infringement: a
patentee must prove that the accused device includes each and every detail
required in the patent’s claim.35 Applying this principle to the context of
infringement based on an offer to sell, the offer to sell (be it an advertisement
or formal contract law offer) must state, directly or indirectly, that the thing
being offered includes each and every limitation of the patent claim.36
Importantly, this Article will assume that the advertisements or promotions of
interest disclose, directly or by context, each and every limitation of the patent
claim. This assumption allows the analysis to focus on whether and what kinds
of advertisements, promotions, or other potentially infringing activity actually
infringe.37
The next Part begins the analysis of the real-world effects of a broader
while outside the United States. Although the court did not explicitly rely on the fact that the
offeror was a U.S. company, the holding might be limited to such scenarios in the future.
32. Id. at 1310 n.4 (“[T]he district court must determine what was offered for sale, not
what was ultimately delivered.”); id. at 1311 (“[W]e reject Maersk USA’s claim that the
entire apparatus must have been constructed and ready for use in order to have been sold.”).
33. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 196-201.
34. It is not unreasonable to think that either the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or the
Supreme Court might broaden the Rotec court’s narrow contract-law definition of an offer.
See id. at 184-85, 195-202 (discussing pre-Rotec Federal Circuit decisions that suggest a
broader definition of an “offer”).
35. Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Each claim limitation must be present either literally or under the doctrine
of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
The same is true for “method” claims, which recite steps for doing something instead of
parts of a device or system, but for simplicity I refer to devices throughout.
36. See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1310-11. For example, an offer to sell a “cell phone”
would not be specific enough to infringe a patent claim requiring a smart phone that includes
pinch-to-zoom software. But if the offer was to sell “cell phone model XYZ,” and the
patentee could prove that model XYZ was a smart phone that includes pinch-to-zoom
software, the patentee could prove infringement.
37. For convenience, throughout this Article I will often use the term “advertisements”
without mentioning “other promotions.” Unless otherwise specified, I am using
“advertisements” as a shorthand for “advertisements and other promotions.”
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definition of an offer under § 271(a).
II.

OBVIOUS EFFECTS: A BROADER DEFINITION OF AN “OFFER” WILL LEAD TO
EARLIER AND MORE PATENT LITIGATION
A. Earlier Patent Litigation

Consider first one obvious effect: if advertisements alone can infringe,
patent holders will generally be able to sue at an earlier time than if they had to
wait for a formal contract-law offer. Because advertisements are invitations for
the recipient to make an offer, advertisements generally precede formal
contract-law offers to sell. Rather than having to wait for the formal offer, the
patent holder would be able to sue when the infringer advertises the infringing
technology.38
Allowing infringement to occur at an earlier time does not seem especially
controversial. Often, the difference in time between an advertisement and the
corresponding offer to sell will be inconsequential. Even where the difference
is lengthier, no strong objection to the timing presents itself. In fact, the
accused infringer may benefit from becoming aware of the infringement claim
sooner rather than later, because the accused can develop a strategy to avoid
infringement (such as by stopping production, designing around the patent, or
taking a license).
B. More Patent Litigation
Secondly, a broader “offer” definition would increase the amount of patent
litigation. This effect is slightly less obvious, but is intuitive when one
considers the realities of discovering infringing conduct. At first blush, it might
appear that including advertisements and promotions in the definition of an
offer would not greatly affect the amount of patent litigation. Since
advertisements most often merely precede formal contract-law offers to sell,
one would expect that all the litigation currently based on formal contract-law
offers would simply shift and be based on the preceding advertisement.39
38. The Federal Circuit made a similar point when it observed that contract-law offers
to sell precede actual sales. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 125960 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., concurring) (“The purpose of § 271(a) was to permit a
patentee to act against threatened infringing sale by establishing a cause of action before
actual sale occurred. It is explained that the ‘main consequence of requiring an actual sale
during the patent term in order to make the offer for sale an act of infringement appears to be
that the date of infringement will reach back to the date of the original offer.’” (quoting
Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving a Date of Invention and Infringement After
GATT/TRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 351-52. (1994))).
39. Of course, there would be a few (probably very few) cases where an advertisement
is made and no formal offer follows. Such occurrences would indeed make possible
additional patent infringement lawsuits under a broader definition of an offer.
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Yet including advertising in the definition of an offer would likely increase
patent litigation for at least two reasons. First, making an advertisement an
infringing act would increase patent litigation because not all advertisements
lead to offers or sales directed at the United States.40 Theoretically, some
advertisements will lead to no sales whatsoever (e.g., a completely failed
advertisement). Other advertisements, especially on the Internet, may be
directed at numerous countries but only lead to offers or sales in a subset of
them. If an advertisement is directed at the United States as well as other
countries, but only leads to formal offers or sales outside of the United States,
those offers and sales would not infringe a U.S. patent because infringing acts
must be tied to the country in which the patent was issued.41
Second, making an advertisement an infringing act would increase patent
litigation because patent holders can usually learn about advertisements more
easily than formal offers to sell. Anyone familiar with litigation will recognize
that learning of infringement is a (sometimes difficult) precondition to bringing
a suit. Advertisements by definition are sent to a wide audience to engender
interest in the item advertised. Formal contract-law offers, in contrast, are often
individualized in nature and may even be confidential, thus making them hard
to discover.
Under the current standard, patentees may of course monitor competitors’
advertisements, looking for hints of future infringement. But even if the
patentee finds an advertisement that suggests a formal, infringing offer for sale
may be forthcoming, the formal offer may be confidential and difficult to
discover. Thus, including advertisements in the “offer” definition will likely
lead to more patent litigation.42 When coupled with the ease of advertising on
(and searching for advertisements on) the Internet, one would expect a sizeable
increase in patent litigation based on advertisements.
If defining “offer” to include advertisements indeed increases the amount
of patent litigation, one may ask whether this is desirable. The answer likely
depends on one’s view of the patent system. Obviously, those who believe the
patent system is generally undesirable or unnecessary to provide adequate
innovation incentives43 will view any accretion in patent rights negatively.
40. As discussed infra in Part III, defining “offer” to include advertisements will also
lead to more litigation because the advertisement may indicate a willingness to sell anywhere
in the world (including the United States), whereas the eventual offer to sell may be only to
sell outside of the United States. Part III also discusses that for an offer to sell to infringe a
U.S. patent, it generally must contemplate an eventual sale inside the United States.
41. See infra Part III.
42. Additionally, under a broader definition of “offer,” patent holders will devote
additional resources to policing (i.e., searching) for infringing advertisements since the
search can lead directly to a lawsuit against a competitor.
43. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 849-50
(1990); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 304 (1989) (“Patents . . . have no place in a regime
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Similarly, those who argue patent incentives are not a net benefit in certain
technology areas44 will be averse to stronger patent rights in those fields.
Likewise, those opining that there is simply too much patent litigation45 might
oppose broader patent rights that would increase litigation.
On the other hand, more nuanced criticisms of the patent system are likely
to have little to say about how broadly courts should define an offer to sell. For
example, many criticisms focus only on specific aspects of the patent system,
such as the issuance of “bad” patents (i.e., undeserving under the current legal
framework),46 forum shopping,47 lawsuits by certain non-practicing entities
(i.e., patent trolls),48 and the lack of clarity in the law.49 These specific
based on individual rights and are insupportable on either the grounds of (utilitarian)
efficiency or of a jurisprudence of law and economics.”); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms
Patent (Or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (suggesting that the majority of manufacturing
industries may not need patents to incentivize innovation).
44. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2001) (noting the inadequacy of current patent
law practice to software issues); Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case
Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 839-40
(2003) (arguing against the desirability of business and software patents); Stuart J.H.
Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1261 (2009) (finding that patents
provide technology startups “relatively weak incentives for core activities in the innovation
process”); Lucas Osborn, Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should Not
Exclude the Patent System, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 325, 349-79 (2008) (analyzing
arguments for and against tax strategy patents and business method patents).
45. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 140-42, 145-46 (2000) (discussing perceived problems and
possible solutions to current patent litigation practices).
46. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 766 (2002) (discussing proposals to improve patent quality);
Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 43, 43 (2010) (“[T]here are ‘bad’ patents everywhere.”); Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2001); Mark
Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION,
Winter 2005, at 10.
47. See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 46, passim (arguing that the inability for many
accused infringers to bring declaratory relief actions in convenient and friendly forums
significantly hinders the patent system from combating the issue of bad patents); Kimberly
A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?,
79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933-37 (2001) (suggesting limiting venue by statute to decrease
transaction costs incurred defending in inconvenient forums, thereby increasing certainty and
predictability for parties).
48. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 329-30 (2010);
Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(2012); Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent
Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 160-61 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Timothy J. Le Duc, Apples Are Not Common Sense in View of Oranges:
Time to Reform KSR’s Illusory Obviousness Standard?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL.
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criticisms, even if accurate, should not necessarily influence whether
advertisements should count as offers under § 271(a). Rather, specific
criticisms are best met by solutions specifically tailored to the problem, rather
than by making broad changes that unnecessarily affect areas not tainted by the
specific criticism.50
This Part has considered some of the most obvious effects of broadening
the definition of an offer. In the remaining Parts, this Article considers some of
the less obvious effects, beginning with the potential for a vast increase in the
extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law.
III.

RIPPLE EFFECTS: A BROADER DEFINITION OF “OFFER” WOULD LEAD TO
MORE EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENT SUITS

A less obvious effect of enlarging the scope of an offer to include
advertisements concerns the potential for U.S. patent law to apply to acts
performed outside of the United States. Patent law’s territorial nature dictates
that, in general, a person is only liable for infringement of a U.S. patent when
the person performs infringing acts “within the United States.”51 Thus, if a
company makes an infringing device but only makes it in Mexico, the U.S.
patent holder has no power to sue the company in the United States.52
Applying this territorial concept to infringement for an offer to sell raises
the question of what must occur within the United States: the offer only (i.e., an
offer made in the United States to sell in another country)? Or the effect of the

PROP. L. 49, 49-50 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s approach to obviousness); Peter
S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 715 (2010) (noting that “scholars roundly criticize the
jurisprudence of claim construction for lacking theoretical or practical coherence”); Kristen
Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1092
(2007) (“[T]he question of subject-matter eligibility for any invention is essentially pro
forma, and whether a patent is granted . . . should be based on the application meeting the
requirements of patentability provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.”); Michael Risch,
Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 658 (2008) (“[T]he PTO and courts should
focus on answering specific questions about how to best apply rigorous standards of novelty,
nonobviousness, utility, and specification with a scalpel rather than simply eliminating broad
swaths of innovation with a machete.”).
50. There are exceptions to this statement. One might change a law that is general in
application because the benefit of the effect on the “problem area” (e.g., patent trolls)
outweighs any detriment in the non-problem area (i.e., all other patents). Because the
number of cases concerning infringement for offering to sell is relatively small compared to
the vast total of patent infringement actions, and because it does not appear that infringement
for offering to sell disproportionately involves specific problem areas of patent law, it is not
obvious that the scope of an offer in patent law should depend on any such problem area.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). For a more robust discussion of the law’s territorial
nature, see infra notes 74-78.
52. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1308-10 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Of course, someone having the Mexican patent
could sue the company in Mexico.
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offer, which would be felt where the advertisement contemplated the future
sales would occur (i.e., an offer made in another country to sell in the United
States)? Both the offer and the effect? In Transocean, the Federal Circuit
answered this question by holding that the “focus should not be on the location
of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would occur pursuant
to the offer. . . . [T]he location of the contemplated sale controls whether there
is an offer to sell within the United States.”53 Under its broadest interpretation,
Transocean means that regardless of whether the offeror is located in the
United States—and regardless of whether the offer was made in the United
States—as long as the contemplated sale would occur in the United States, the
offer can constitute infringement.
Extending the Transocean “contemplated sale” test to a broadened
definition of an offer would create a scenario in which foreign entities could be
liable for patent infringement for advertising infringing technology, regardless
of where in the entire world they made the advertisements.54 Just as the offer in
Transocean constituted infringement even though it was made in Norway,55 an
advertisement made in a newspaper in China or Germany might constitute
infringement of a U.S. patent if it contemplated a future sale in the United
States! A moment’s reflection should reveal that this could lead to a huge
increase in claims of patent infringement against foreign entities and activities
depending on how courts extend the Transocean case to advertisements.
But extending Transocean’s “contemplated sale” test to advertisements
raises difficulties: do advertisements “contemplate” a location for future sales?
While contract-law offers to sell must be relatively formal and thus likely to
identify a specific location for the contemplated sale, advertisements often do
not explicitly specify a location of contemplated sales. Indeed, advertisements,
which by definition are broadcast to a wide audience, may “contemplate” (or at
least hope for) future sales in many locations.56
Imagine that a company holds a U.S. patent on a certain widget and that the
widget is not patented in any other country. A German competitor could thus
make, use, and sell the widget in Germany without infringing the U.S. patent.
But what if the German competitor ran an advertisement promoting the widget?
When will such an advertisement “contemplate” a future sale in the United
States? Does the answer change depending on whether the advertisement
53. Id. at 1309.
54. Recall the caveat that in the actual Transocean case, the accused infringer was a

U.S. company making an offer while in a foreign country. Supra note 31 and accompanying
text. The court did not explicitly rely on the fact that the company was based in the United
States, but it may be grounds for future cases to limit the holding. See Transocean, 617 F.3d
at 1309 (“This case presents the question whether an offer which is made in Norway by a
U.S. company to a U.S. company to sell a product within the U.S., for delivery and use
within the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a).”).
55. Id. at 1308-09.
56. This discussion uses the term “advertisements,” but analogies to other promotional
activities, which might be less widespread or less formal, are readily possible.
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appeared only in a German magazine? In a U.S. magazine? On the Internet, but
only in the German language? On the Internet, in both German and English?
A. Possible Tests for Whether an Advertisement “Contemplates” a Future
Sale in the United States
In applying Transocean’s “contemplated sale” test to advertisements, it
must be emphasized that “contemplation” does not necessarily require intent
for or awareness of eventual sales in the United States. The harm caused by
advertisements, price erosion,57 occurs regardless of the advertising party’s
intent or awareness. The contemplation test’s purpose in the context of
advertisements is to discern whether the advertisement will likely cause price
erosion.58 Rather than focusing on the advertiser’s intent, the law must rely on
surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether an advertisement contemplated
a future sale in the United States. The following Subparts consider a few
potential tests for whether an advertisement contemplates a future sale in the
United States and recommends which test to adopt.
1. The Text Test
The law could presume that advertisements do not specifically contemplate
sales in any country, and therefore do not infringe in any country, unless the
text of the advertisement specifies the location(s) of the future sales. The main
benefit of a text-based test is clarity; one simply reads or listens to the words of
the advertisement to discern if the United States is mentioned as a place for
future sales.
On the other hand, the test is arbitrary and would be easy for would-be
infringers to get around. Common experience shows that most advertisements
do not specifically state the location of future sales. A would-be infringer could
avoid infringement by simply not mentioning the United States, while being
free to use context and innuendo to make clear that he contemplates sales to the
United States. Such a formalistic test would therefore reduce the number of
advertisements that infringe, assuming the advertisers adapt to the law.

57. Price erosion refers to the downward price pressure on patented goods when a
competitor signals to the market that it will offer a competing (often infringing) good, since
the market expects the patentee to lower its price to compete with the infringer. See, e.g.,
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1308 (citing Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 791-92).
For additional discussion of price erosion, see infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
58. See sources cited infra note 139 for the proposition that price erosion can be
difficult to prove with certainty and may not always occur even with formal, contract-law
offers to sell. Rather than forcing a plaintiff to prove price erosion early in litigation, the
contemplation test serves as a proxy for whether price erosion is likely to have occurred. The
plaintiff will prove the amount of price erosion, if any, at a later stage in the litigation.
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2. The Origination Test
As a second test, the law could presume that an advertisement only
contemplates future sales in the country in which it originates, unless the
content of the advertisement specifically includes or excludes the United States
as a location for future sales.59 As used here, an advertisement “originates”
from the country in which it is developed. For print advertisements, an
advertisement is often printed where it is developed. In the Internet context, the
place where the advertisement originates is less clear because the advertisement
will most likely be instantly accessible worldwide, but may be hosted on a
server anywhere in the world. For simplicity, an Internet advertisement could
be deemed to originate in the country from which the would-be infringer
directed the advertisement’s launch.
An origination test has some clarity, but it is exceedingly arbitrary because
the location from which the advertisement originates may bear little
relationship to where the impact of the advertisement will be felt or where the
future sales are likely to occur. If a magazine with the advertisement is printed
in Mexico, but all the magazines are shipped to the United States, the primary
impact of the advertisement will almost certainly be in the United States. The
test may also be easy to evade: a would-be infringer could simply orchestrate
initial publication in a country where the technology is not patented. Indeed, an
origination test would directly contravene the Transocean court’s emphasis on
the location of the contemplated sale, not the location of the offer.
3. The Appearance Test
The law could presume that an advertisement only contemplates future
sales in the country/countries in which the advertisement appears, unless the
content of the advertisement specifically includes or excludes the United States
as a location for future sales. For example, if a magazine intended for U.S.
distribution contains an advertisement of infringing technology and is actually
distributed in the United States, the advertiser would be liable for infringement.
Generally, the appearance test is likely to be a decent proxy for where the
future sales are contemplated (excluding some website-based advertisements),
since a company will generally strive to direct advertisements to its intended
customers. This is especially true for print, radio, and television advertisements
that often must specifically be directed to each country in which it appears.
At least one caveat must be included even with print, radio, and television
advertisements: de minimus and accidental appearances in a country should not
make the competitor liable. For example, it is possible for a magazine that is
59. The latter part of the proposed test (relating to the text of the advertisement) could
be dropped, but fairness suggests leaving it in. If an advertisement specifically includes or
excludes the United States, liability for infringement based on the advertisement should take
account of the revealed intent, unless it is shown to be a sham to avoid liability.
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sold only in China to be carried by an individual to the United States, or for a
second-hand distributor to resell a few of the Chinese magazines in the United
States, but this sort of minimal migration should not count as an “appearance”
in the United States.
As with so many areas of the law, special attention must be given to
internet-based advertisements. Some internet-based advertisements—such as
banner and pop-up advertisements—may be specifically directed to a given
country.60 On the other hand, when a competitor advertises its technology via
the text/media on its own web page, the appearance test may be less useful as a
proxy for the advertiser’s intent. This is because web pages automatically
“appear” across the globe.
Internet domain names,61 particularly top-level domains (“TLDs”) (such as
.edu, .com, or .it),62 may give clues regarding where the web page is directed.63
Some TLDs, such as .com, .net, and .org, are generic and may not tell much
about geotargeting, but others (called country code TLDs, or “ccTLDs”) are
country specific, such as .de (Germany) and .jp (Japan).64
If an Italian company advertises on its company website on the .it domain
and in the Italian language, it strongly suggests that no harm will occur in the
United States,65 even though a U.S.-based user could most likely access the
website by typing the web address directly into a browser. On the other hand,
especially for generic TLDs, it is improvident to assume that because websites
appear everywhere, they therefore are targeted nowhere.66 Website owners are
60. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-126 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing Google’s search results and its AdWords and Keyword Suggestion Tool
programs); John Mueller, Working with Multi-regional Websites, GOOGLE WEBMASTER
CENTRAL BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com
/2010/03/working-with-multi-regional-websites.html (discussing Google’s ability to use
geotargeting factors).
61. Internet domain names are the alphanumeric characters that appear after the two
slashes in a World Wide Web address, e.g., http://law.campbell.edu.
62. In the address law.campbell.edu, the “.edu” is the top-level domain and
“campbell” is the second-level domain. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 39 (2000).
63. See Mueller, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. See id. (“Users and search engines use [ccTLDs] as a strong sign that your website
is explicitly for a certain country. . . . Other signals can give us hints. This could be from
local addresses & phone numbers on the pages, use of local language and currency . . . . ”).
66. Commentators have highlighted the logical flaw in reasoning that because the
Internet is ubiquitous, it is targeted nowhere. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the
Wrong Target: The “Audience Targeting” Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet
Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 559 (2012) (noting in the defamation context that
Internet publications are not directed “nowhere” and that publishers “use the medium
precisely because of its scope”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 71, 88 (“A primary flaw of the prevailing approach is its rejection of the ubiquitous
nature of Internet activity in favor of a fictitious presumption that Internet activity is targeted
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often happy to have their sites available as widely as possible. In addition,
although it can be expensive and imperfect, at least some website owners can
take advantage of technology to limit the countries in which the website
appears.67 Given these concerns, the law should consider a more nuanced test
than the appearance test.
4. The Total Context Test
In a complex, interconnected world, the law would do best by eschewing
the above relatively simple tests. Instead, the law should determine where an
advertisement contemplates future sales based on the entire context
surrounding the advertisement. Such a test would consider the factors discussed
in the previous proposed tests, as well as others. Factors would include:
 whether the content of the advertisement specifies or excludes
future sales to the United States;
 the type of media used (print, television, internet banner ads,
internet web pages, etc.);
 where the advertisement originated;
 the citizenship and/or physical location(s) of the entity making the
advertisement;68
 where the advertisement appeared, including
o the number of appearances in the United States, including
number of U.S. views of a webpage;
o the internet domain in which a website appears (e.g., .it
for Italy, versus .com);69
o the use, or lack of, geo-location filters to direct or exclude
internet web page advertisements to or from the United
States;70
 the language (English versus non-English) and currency (U.S.
dollars versus other currency) used in the advertisement;71 and
nowhere.”).
67. Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy: The
Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 61, 66-78 (2011) (describing the technology that companies can, among other things,
use to limit where their websites appear); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location
Technologies and Other Means of Placing Borders on the ‘Borderless’ Internet, 23 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 107-120 (2004) (noting same).
68. By “entity making the advertisement” I mean the company that intends to
commercialize the allegedly infringing technology, not any third party intermediaries
(advertising firms, Internet service providers, magazine companies, etc.) that might assist in
creating or distributing the advertisement. For more on third-party intermediary liability, see
infra Subpart V.A.
69. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71. Some of these factors are the same or analogous to factors used in cases deciding
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 the intent of the accused infringer who made the advertisement.72
Under the total context test, a court should balance the above factors, and
any other relevant facts, to ascertain whether the advertisement contemplates
future sales in the United States. As stated, the test is an objective, not
subjective one: courts should not be concerned with the actual intent of the
parties. Rather, the goal of the test is to predict when harm from price-erosion
is likely in the United States. Bright lines will be impossible to draw and courts
will need to analyze the issue on a case-by-case basis. If the advertisement
contemplates future sales in the United States, it should be actionable as
infringement because it could harm the U.S. patent holder via price erosion in
the United States.
Thus, infringing advertisements could include those made from within the
United States73 and those originating abroad, as long as they contemplate an
eventual sale within the United States. The possibility that non-U.S. actors
might be liable for acts committed outside of the United States should raise
caution lest the extraterritorial application of U.S. law expands too greatly. The
next Subpart discusses the concerns of extraterritorial application of U.S. patent
law.
B. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law Based on
Advertisements of Infringing Technology
Using the total context test (discussed in the immediately preceding
Subpart) to determine whether an advertisement contemplates future sales in
the United States would sometimes lead courts to hold actors guilty of
infringing U.S. patents even though the actions occurred outside of the United
States. Even if an advertisement appears only in Germany, for instance, it may
clearly contemplate future sales in the United States and thus be actionable.
Further, given the global nature of the Internet, Internet advertisements will
often appear in the United States and may contemplate future sales in the
United States.
These and other scenarios may violate the U.S. legal system’s presumption
whether personal jurisdiction exists in Internet-based tort lawsuits. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us,
Inc., v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting, among other facts, that the
defendant’s “web sites are entirely in Spanish; prices for its merchandise are in pesetas or
Euros, and merchandise can be shipped only to addresses within Spain”).
72. While the test is an objective test and intent should not control, the intent of the
advertising party can help inform whether the advertisement is likely to cause price erosion.
After all, if the accused infringer intended to sell into the United States, this suggests that
price erosion in the United States is more likely.
73. Recall that the Transocean court’s focus on the eventual sale rather than the
location of the offer means that even if an advertisement is made in the United States, it
would not be actionable as infringement unless it contemplated an eventual sale in the
United States. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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that the laws of the United States do not apply extraterritorially.74 The
presumption against extraterritoriality is a cannon of statutory construction with
a long history, although the presumption’s strength has varied over time.75 The
presumption is rooted in theories about international relationships and
congressional intent,76 though some have questioned whether courts should
continue to recognize the presumption.77
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently invigorated the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Indeed, just three years before the
Transocean decision, the Supreme Court declared that the presumption “applies
with particular force in patent law.”78 The Supreme Court’s warning did not,
however, appear to impress the Transocean panel of judges. The Transocean
court cited the Microsoft case and noted that it was “mindful of the
presumption against extraterritoriality,” but proceeded to use broad language in
the opinion that portends significant extraterritorial application79 unless the
case is limited to its facts.80
The Transocean decision may not be the rebellion against Supreme Court
authority that it initially appears. The legal system has varying views about the

74. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual
Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 510-13 (1997); William S. Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 91-112 (1998).
75. Bradley, supra note 74, at 507, 510-13. In the copyright context, which is often
considered analogous to the patent context, the Supreme Court has recently expanded the
extraterritorial reach of copyright law. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
1351, 1355-56 (2013) (holding that the first sale doctrine extinguishes the U.S. copyright
holder’s right to prevent importation of a copy lawfully made outside of the United States).
76. Bradley, supra note 74, at 513-16 (discussing five justifications for the
presumption: international law, international comity, choice-of-law principles, likely
congressional intent, and separation-of-powers considerations).
77. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law,
24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 1-2 (1992); Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 600-02
(1990).
78. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007). Note that the
Kirtsaeng case, discussed supra note 75, may by analogy portend an increase in the
extraterritorial application of patent law. On the other hand, after Kirtsaeng, the Supreme
Court applied a strong presumption against extraterritorial effects of the Alien Tort Statute.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-69 (2013) (holding that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute, and that
nothing in the statute rebuts the presumption); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34
CAMPBELL L. REV. 581, 597-607 (2012) (discussing the limits of extraterritoriality).
79. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that “the location of the contemplated sale
controls whether there is an offer to sell within the United States”).
80. The companies in Transocean were U.S., not foreign, companies. See id.; see also
Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4, at 1117-18.
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meaning of the presumption against extraterritoriality, which stem in part from
the ability to distinguish between the location of conduct and the location of the
effects of the conduct.81 Professor Dodge outlines three possibilities for the
meaning:
First the presumption might mean that acts of Congress should apply only to
conduct that occurs within the United States, unless a contrary intent appears,
regardless of whether that conduct causes effects in the United States . . . .
Second, the presumption might mean that acts of Congress apply only to
conduct that causes effects within the United States, unless a contrary intent
appears, regardless of where that conduct occurs . . . . Third, the presumption
might mean that acts of Congress apply to conduct occurring within or having
an effect within the United States, unless a contrary intent appears. 82

While the Transocean court did not squarely address the extraterritoriality
issue, the court’s focus on the effects of the offer to the exclusion of the
location of the offer demonstrates the court’s affinity for the second meaning
listed by Professor Dodge.83
The purpose of this Subpart of the Article is not to attack or defend the
Transocean court’s potentially broad holding. Rather, having shown that
extending the holding to advertisements might likewise have significant
extraterritorial effects, the remaining Subparts discuss how to limit those
effects.
Two areas of law may limit (but by no means extinguish) the
extraterritorial impact of U.S. patent law based on advertisements of infringing
technology. First, the above-described “total context test” for determining when
an advertisement contemplates future sales in the United States will limit
lawsuits to those very likely to have an effect in the United States. Second, the
principles of personal jurisdiction will further screen out unfair applications of
U.S. patent law to foreign actors.
1. The Total Context Test for Advertisements Limits the Unfair
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law
The total context test, described in Subpart III.A.4 above, determines
whether an advertisement contemplates future sales in the United States and
thus whether it is actionable as infringement under an expanded definition of an
offer to sell. A well-applied test will ensure that judicial interpretation of patent
law’s offer to sell provision is consistent with the view that U.S. laws may
81. Dodge, supra note 74, at 87-88.
82. Id. at 88-89 (emphasis added); see also Bradley, supra note 74, at 517 (“[T]here is

now substantial agreement that nations may, under certain circumstances, regulate
extraterritorial conduct that has effects within their territory.”).
83. See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (“These acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a
U.S. patentee.”); Holbrook, Transocean, supra note 4, at 1104 (“In essence, the Transocean
rule is a form of an effects-based test, where the exercise of U.S. law is justified because the
act—the offer—will have effects within the United States.”).
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control foreign conduct that causes effects within the United States. Hence, the
total context test’s factors are designed to predict whether the advertisement is
likely to cause price erosion in the United States.84
For example, if an advertisement specifies future sales to the United States,
this is a strong indication that price erosion may occur in the United States.
Similarly, if an advertisement makes clear that no sales will be made to the
United States, price erosion in the United States is highly unlikely, unless the
disclaimer is a sham and everyone knows it.
In addition, an English-language advertisement made by a U.S. company
on its internet web page suggests (absent additional facts) it contemplates sales
in the United States. Contrast that with a German-language advertisement made
by a German company on its internet web page using the “.de” ccTLD, which
suggests it contemplates sales in Germany. Absent additional facts, the German
advertisement is unlikely to cause price erosion in the United States, and thus
should not be actionable in the United States. Add an additional fact, however,
that the advertisement specifically mentions that sales will be to the United
States, and of course the analysis changes to predict effects in the United
States.
These short examples demonstrate the total context test’s role in limiting
the extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law. Under an effects-based
understanding of the law, an advertisement that will likely cause price erosion
in the United States should be actionable in U.S. courts.
The total context test’s role is not limited to validating a statutory
construction that permits application of U.S. law to foreign actors. In addition,
the test ensures that U.S. patent law—specifically § 271(a)’s offer to sell
provision—comports with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. Although
the law continues to evolve in this area, courts and commentators increasingly
understand that at least the Fifth Amendment85 and the Foreign Commerce
Clause86 provide substantive constraints on the extraterritorial application of
84. Of course, whether price erosion actually occurs will depend on market conditions,
including the availability of non-infringing substitutes, see infra note 138, but the total
context test does not seek to prove that price erosion actually occurred, only that the
advertisement likely would have caused it assuming the additional market conditions exist.
The patent holder would have to prove that price erosion actually occurred in the damages
phase.
85. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (“When the Supreme Court finally does
address this question, we believe the proper answer is clear: the Fifth Amendment limits
extraterritorial application of substantive federal law.”) (emphasis in original); Willis L. M.
Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587-88 (1978). But see A. Mark
Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 384-417 (1997) (arguing that due process does not limit the territorial
reach of federal law).
86. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121,
146-51 (2007) (discussing the Foreign Commerce Clause in the context of laws concerning
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U.S. laws.87 By tying liability under § 271(a)’s offer-to-sell provision to the
cases where U.S. patent holders will likely feel significant effects, the total
context test brings § 271(a)’s extraterritorial applications within the
Constitution’s boundaries.
Besides corralling the reach of the total context test, the Constitution
provides another important limitation on potentially unfair applications of U.S.
laws to foreign actors: namely, the requirement that U.S. courts have personal
jurisdiction over defendants. The next Subpart explores this limitation.
2. The Requirement of Personal Jurisdiction Limits the Unfair
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law
In addition to the substantive Constitutional constraints placed on laws
having extraterritorial effects, the Constitution also collaterally limits
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws via the requirement of personal
jurisdiction. The purpose of this Subpart is not to provide a full exposition of
the expansive and somewhat murky law regarding personal jurisdiction, but
rather to highlight the ways in which the modern doctrine can limit the
instances of unfair applications of U.S. laws to foreign defendants.
a.

Personal Jurisdiction Basics

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution to place limits on a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.88 In
the twentieth century, personal jurisdiction doctrine shifted from a view that
required the defendant’s presence within geographical boundaries89 to one that
emphasized reasonableness and fairness.90 The Supreme Court’s opinion in
terrorism) [hereinafter, Colangelo, Terrorism]; Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign
Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 951-58 (2010) (describing limits on extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws imposed by the foreign commerce clause); Eugene Kontorovich,
Beyond the Article I Horizon, Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction
Over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1248-51 (2009) (discussing the Foreign
Commerce Clause in the criminal law context).
87. Note that different aspects of the Constitution regulate the ability of states within
the United States to regulate conduct outside their state borders, particularly the Fourteenth
Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Colangelo, Terrorism, supra note
86, at 146-47 (comparing the Foreign and “Domestic” commerce clauses), 159 (comparing
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
88. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
Where Federal law (such as patent law), as opposed to state law applies to a cause of action,
there is some confusion as to whether the Due Process Clause is that of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d
1355, 1358 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit has stated that the issue is “purely
academic” because it applies the same test regardless which Amendment applies. Id.
89. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”).
90. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-85 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co. v.
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington91 focused the test of personal jurisdiction
around two concepts: first, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, and
second, fairness.92
Courts distinguish between the concepts of “general personal jurisdiction”
and “specific personal jurisdiction.”93 General personal jurisdiction in a forum
exists over a defendant whose activities in the forum are “continuous and
systematic” such that they may be considered “essentially at home in the
forum.”94 An example would be an individual’s domicile or a business’s place
of incorporation and principal place of business.95 When a defendant is subject
to general personal jurisdiction in a forum, the forum has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant even where the actions giving rise to the lawsuit are wholly
unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.96
When the defendant’s contacts are too sparse to create general personal
jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction if the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state nonetheless meets a certain threshold
and the claims at issue “arise out of or are connected with” those contacts.97 To
justify this “specific” personal jurisdiction, the defendant’s claim-related
contacts must demonstrate that it “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”98
One subtest for specific personal jurisdiction based on a specific fact
pattern bears mention. In the intentional tort context, courts have found specific
personal jurisdiction based on the effects of an intentional tort committed by a
defendant who “expressly aimed” the tortuous conduct at the forum and the
plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum.99 Patent infringement is a
tort,100 and thus such tests may have some applicability where the patent
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
91. 326 U.S. 310.
92. Id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (citations omitted).
93. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011).
94. Id. at 2851.
95. Id. at 2853-54.
96. Id. at 2854.
97. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-88 (2011).
98. Id. The Federal Circuit’s application of Supreme Court law has led to a three-part
test for whether specific personal jurisdiction exists: (1) the defendant “purposefully
directed” its activities at residents of the forum state; (2) the claim “arises out of or relates to
those activities;” and (3) personal jurisdiction can be fairly exercised while still comporting
with “fair play and substantial justice.” Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1985)).
99. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); Ludington, supra note 66, at
344.
100. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894) (“The transaction as stated
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infringement is intentional. But whether or not patent infringement is an
intentional tort is the subject of some confusion.101 Perhaps this is because a
plaintiff need not show the defendant intended to infringe,102 but a plaintiff
may obtain enhanced damages if he can show the infringement was “willful,”
which is somewhat like “intentional.”103 Where the patent infringement based
on an advertisement is intentional, courts might find specific personal
jurisdiction based on a Calder-like effects test. This would include cases where
the U.S. patent holder felt the brunt of the harm in the United States and where
the infringer expressly aimed the advertisement at the United States. Indeed,
such a personal jurisdiction test mirrors some of the factors of the total context
test.
Even where a defendant interacts with a forum extensively enough to meet
the “contacts” requirement of jurisdiction, the court must also find that
exercising jurisdiction is fair.104 Factors for this murky analysis include the
burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum, the interests of the forum
State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.105 Where the case involves
a non-U.S. defendant, the analysis should also include considerations of the
policies of other nations and the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign
relations policies.106
Though the intricacies of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are winding
and unsettled, the upshot is that a non-U.S. defendant will not be subject to
jurisdiction in the United States unless it has certain minimum contacts with the
United States and the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair.107 Personal
in the petition . . . was a tort pure and simple.”).
101. Compare Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“Copyright infringement unlike patent infringement is an intentional tort . . . ”),
with Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298, 307 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004)
(stating in the bankruptcy context that patent infringement “has historically been viewed” as
an intentional tort).
102. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (“Intent becomes a requirement only if and when the patent owner seeks
enhanced damages or attorneys fees for willful infringement . . . .”).
103. Willful infringement contains separate objective and subjective inquiries. In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Under the objective inquiry, “a
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent . . . .
The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.” Id. at
1371. If the objective inquiry is met, “the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it should have been known
to the accused infringer.” Id.
104. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011).
105. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987).
106. Id. at 115; see also Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The
Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1518-25
(2013) (analyzing transnational personal jurisdiction).
107. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2787. It should be noted that even when
jurisdiction is authorized, a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction under the
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jurisdiction jurisprudence thus works alongside the proposed total context test
for advertisements to safeguard against unfair applications of U.S. law against
foreign actors.108 Considering both tests, then, there are three scenarios where a
patent infringement claim based on an advertisement would not be litigated in
the United States: (1) where the advertisement fails the total context test and
the defendant is not subject to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the United
States; (2) where the advertisement fails the total context test even though the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction somewhere in the United States;
and (3) where the advertisement meets the total context test but the defendant is
not subject to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the United States.
Thus, for example, even where a foreign defendant is subject to general
personal jurisdiction based on extensive contacts with the United States, if the
advertisement fails the total context test, the defendant will not need to litigate
in the United States. Only when a claim for patent infringement satisfies both
the total context test and personal jurisdiction requirements will the foreign
defendant be forced to litigate in the United States.109
C. Conclusion
This Part demonstrates how a seemingly small change in the law (a broader
definition of an offer in § 271(a)) can interact with other changes in the law
(the Transocean decision) to produce far-ranging consequences. Permitting so
many potential causes of action based on foreign activities might suggest that a
broader definition of an offer is a bad idea. Rather than abandon the broader
definition, however, courts instead must carefully craft a test for when an
advertisement of infringing technology will be actionable in the United States.
In addition, courts can rely on personal jurisdiction doctrine to protect many
foreign actors from unfair applications of U.S. law.
Those who would compete with patent holders must structure their
advertisements appropriately to avoid harming the U.S. patent holder. For
advertisements that do contemplate an eventual sale in the United States,
allowing a suit for patent infringement will often be fair: a person should often
be held liable for attempting to generate commercial interest in infringing
doctrine of forum non conveniens if the action can be brought in another forum. Sinochem
Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007). To simplify the
analysis, this article does not address forum non conveniens, but it would provide an
additional check against unfairness for a foreign litigant. See Childress, supra note 106, at
1528-43 (analyzing transnational forum non conveniens); Christopher A. Whytock &
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1452-62 (2011) (same).
108. See Childress, supra note 106, at 1525-28 (describing how both personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens work as a proxy for choice of law).
109. Of course, the claim will have to cross additional hurdles, including that the patent
is valid and infringed, that venue exists, and that the court should not exercise its
discretionary power based on forum non conveniens.
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technology when it harms the patent holder in the United States.110
IV.

MORE EFFECTS: UNCERTAINTY (AND HOW TO MINIMIZE IT)

As discussed above in Part II, defining the term “offer” to include
advertisements and similar commercializing activities would cause competitors
to face more infringement suits, and those suits would occur at an earlier point
in time. In addition, the broadened definition of an offer may have unintended
consequences if competitors are unable to ascertain what activities constitute
“advertisements and other promotions.” Businesses prefer certainty and if they
are unable to determine which activities will avoid infringement, they may err
on the side of caution, thus foregoing beneficial economic activity.111
A. Changing the “Offer” Definition Risks Creating Uncertainty; Clearer
Rules Lessen the Impact
The risk that broadening the definition of an infringing offer may result in
uncertainty does not necessarily mean that lawmakers should simply maintain
the current suboptimal definition.112 Rather, the preferred solution should be to
make the new definition as clear as possible. That is, courts should strive to
make the test more rule-like, rather than standard-like.
1. Rules Are Theoretically Preferable to Standards
In the context of a test’s clarity, room exists for a variety of tests falling
along the familiar spectrum of rules versus standards. Scholars have analyzed
rules and standards extensively113 and recent literature has explored rules
110. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 174-76.
111. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the

Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303-06 (1984); Troy A. Paredes, A Systems
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the
Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-34 (2004) (stating that certainty in law “is a
valuable asset that facilitates business and investing”). But see Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer,
Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse
Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1000-01 (1999)
(suggesting that uncertainty regarding patent law remedies may reduce the deadweight losses
involved with patents).
112. See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
419, 461 (2012) [hereinafter Osborn, Instrumentalism] (discussing the difference between a
precise test (i.e., reproducible) versus an accurate test (i.e., gives the “correct” answer)).
113. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-29
(1967); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M. Rose,
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versus standards in relation to patent law.114 A familiar example of a rule is a
speed limit of “55 miles per hour,” while a familiar corresponding standard is
“drive at a reasonable speed.”
Supporters of rules laud their ability to facilitate efficient allocation by
providing ex ante certainty.115 Certainty allows businesses to maximize their
opportunities for economic advancement by organizing their activities around
whatever legal test is adopted, even if it is imperfect.116 Rule-like tests permit
businesses to conduct their operations with precision, giving them clear signals
about permissible behavior. To the extent that businesses perceive economic
advantage by engineering their activities to approach the bright-line edge of the
rule, companies will do so.
On the other hand, standard-like tests are flexible, which might have ex
post benefits associated with fairness and pragmatism.117 But that same
flexibility generally yields less predictable results because standards may invite
inconsistent judicial application118 and leave parties uncertain ex ante as to
permissible behavior.119 Hence, parties may forego permissible activity in an
effort to avoid the risk of incurring liability.
Since businesses desire certainty, lawmakers should strive for it in defining
what sort of offer will infringe. An unclear definition would allow patent
holders to threaten litigation against activity that probably does not fall within
the definition of an offer. Such uncertainty and threats of litigation will lead to
under-investment by competitors who will likely prefer to err on the side of
caution (e.g., avoid activities that are close to, but not included in, the definition
of an offer to sell) rather than risk exposure to infringement liability.120 As a
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Justice Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953
(1995).
114. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 611 (2009); Osborn, Instrumentalism, supra note 112, at 424,
461; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
115. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 111, at 312-14; Kaplow, supra note 113, at
575-76.
116. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”), overruled in
part by Helvering v. Mountain Prods. Corp., 58 S. Ct. 623 (1938).
117. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 11-13 (criticizing the ex post
considerations of standards and preferring to focus on the position of the parties before the
dispute or deal); Rose, supra note 113, at 591-93.
118. See Kaplow, supra note 113, at 587-88.
119. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 113, at 591.
120. Infringement results in damages of lost profits, or at a minimum, a reasonable
royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”). The court has
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result, the market will receive less technology and competition than if
uncertainty did not exist. While this discussion only scratches the surface of the
rules versus standards debate, it should be clear that a rule is theoretically
preferable to a standard in the context of patent litigation.
While a rule may be theoretically preferable to a standard in patent
litigation, an important consideration is whether lawmakers can, practically
speaking, draft a workable rule. In general, where a test covers myriad actions
and scenarios that do not share common facts or elements, it will be difficult to
draft a workable, simple rule.121 For instance, negligence applies to numerous
acts, but those acts vary widely in terms of their particular key facts,122 thus
making a simple rule difficult to draft. On the other hand, basic income tax
covers numerous acts, most of which share factually similar elements,123 thus
making a rule much more efficient and easy to draft.
2. Lawmakers Will Have Trouble Drafting a Simple, Clear Rule
Because offers and advertisements come in all shapes and sizes, lawmakers
will have difficulty drafting a simple rule. Currently the definition of an offer
includes contract-law offers but excludes most advertisements and other
promotions. As discussed, the primary policy behind making an offer to sell an
act of infringement is to prevent competitors from generating commercial
interest in infringing technology to the detriment of the patentee.124 Since
advertisements and other promotions exist primarily to generate commercial
interest,125 they should be included within the definition of an offer.
Yet including “advertisements and other promotions” within the “offer”
definition will create uncertainty unless lawmakers can define with some rulelike precision what constitutes “advertisements” and “promotions.” On the
other hand, creating clear, rule-like definitions of “advertisements” and
“promotions” will be a difficult task. The terms are not defined in the patent
statutes. Law dictionaries define “advertising” broadly to include any “action of

discretion to increase the damages up to treble damages. Id. (“[T]he court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). Further, courts can issue
injunctions. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
121. Kaplow, supra note 113, at 563-64, 573; Sunstein, supra note 113, at 1003.
Theoretically, one could draft a complex rule to cover all anticipated fact patterns. Kaplow,
supra note 113, at 590-96 (noting the difference between simple and complex rules and
standards). Practically speaking, complex rules are rarely adopted by courts.
122. For example, driving, food handling, floor maintenance, surgery, etc.
123. For example, though peoples’ earning amounts and sources may vary widely, they
can be grouped together as “income.”
124. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173.
125. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 25
(4th ed. 2000) (defining “advertisement” as “[a] notice, such as a poster or a paid
announcement in the print, broadcast, or electronic media, designed to attract public
attention or patronage”).
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drawing the public’s attention to something to promote its sale.”126
Other areas of the law may assist in crafting a definition. The terms appear
in another intellectual property statute—the Lanham Act127—but it does not
define them.128 Case law interpreting the Lanham Act indicates that widelydistributed commercial promotion constitutes “advertising,” but courts have
struggled with how widely-distributed the promotional activities must be to
constitute “advertising.”129 Furthermore, the Lanham Act distinguishes
between “advertising” and “promotion” by listing them separately.130 Courts
note that a distinction exists between “advertising” and “promotion,” but they
seldom pinpoint it other than to note that “promotion” is more inclusive than
traditional advertising, which must be disseminated widely.131 The Second
Circuit provided some assistance when it observed:
[T]he distinction between advertising and promotion lies in the form of the
representation. Although advertising is generally understood to consist of
widespread communication through print or broadcast media, “promotion”
may take other forms of publicity used in the relevant industry, such as
displays at trade shows and sales presentations to buyers. 132

Courts continue to vary widely regarding what communications constitute
“advertising” or “promotion.” Some courts define advertising and promotions
as activities that reach more than a few individuals of the relevant purchasing
public, while others allow even a single letter to suffice.133
126.
127.
128.
129.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (9th ed. 2009).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2012).
See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
See 1 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ADVERTISING § 11.02 n.356
(Matthew Bender 2013) (collecting cases).
130. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (“Any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”) (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Gmurzynska v. Hutton, 355 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough
representations less formal than those made as part of a classic advertising campaign may
suffice, they must be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public.”) (quoting
Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 2002));
Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The courts are also in
agreement, however, that ‘the Act’s reach is broader than merely the “classic advertising
campaign.”’”) (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F.
Supp. 1521, 1534 (S.D.N.Y.1994)).
132. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, 314 F.3d at 57.
133. See ASTRACHAN ET AL., supra note 129, at § 11.02 n.356 (collecting cases).
Compare First Health Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 803-04 (7th Cir.
2001) (“Advertising is a form of promotion to anonymous recipients, as distinguished from
face-to-face communication. In normal usage, an advertisement read by millions (or even
thousands in a trade magazine) is advertising, while a person-to-person pitch by an account
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If many decades of interpretation of the Lanham Act have failed to reveal
clear definitions of advertising and promotions, the task is likely not feasible.
Yet lawmakers should not simply give up and fail to provide any guidance. Nor
should lawmakers exclude “advertisements” and “promotions” from patent
law’s definition of an offer simply because clear rules are difficult to draft.
Indeed, while defining “advertisements” with precision is difficult, the same is
true with the definition of a contract-law offer. Contract law requires no
particular words or actions to make an offer, and the same words can amount to
an offer in one circumstance but not in another.134 If decades of Lanham Act
interpretation demonstrate the difficulty of defining an “advertisement,”
centuries of contract law demonstrate the difficulty of drafting a simple rule to
cover the myriad acts that might constitute a formal offer to sell.
In many cases, actions that fall just short of constituting a contract-law
offer will fall clearly within a definition of promotional activity.135 To some
extent then, if lawmakers broaden patent law’s definition of an offer from the
contract-law definition to one that includes advertisements and promotions,
they will simply be trading one uncertain question for another. The net
uncertainty may not increase much, if at all.
Hence, lawmakers should appreciate that a simple, clear rule may be
difficult to create, but should strive to give as much guidance as possible. The
next Subpart provides specific recommendations for a test that will provide
clarity to the definition of “advertising and other promotions.”
B. Patent Law’s Definition of an “Offer” Should Include an Objective
“Commercialization” Test
The Federal Circuit has established that the primary policy behind making
an “offer to sell” an act of infringement is to prevent competitors from
generating commercial interest in infringing technology to the detriment of the
patentee.136 To give competitors clarity, lawmakers should tie the definition of
an offer to the concept of commercialization. Thus, lawmakers should be less

executive is not.”), with Seven-Up Co., 86 F.3d at 1386 (presentation made to eleven bottlers
is advertising or promotion), and Mobius Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software,
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding single letter actionable).
134. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 15, at 108 (“[T]here is no magic formula to
determine whether a particular communication is an offer . . . . [T]he ordinary meaning of
language is influential, but never determinative. For example, the word ‘quote’ may be
understood as making a commitment, while the word ‘offer’ may, in context be deemed a
mere price quotation.”) (footnote omitted).
135. A number of cases find language to fall just short of an offer, and instead to be
merely quotations, proposals, invitations to treat, etc. See, e.g., Cox v. Denton, 180 P. 261,
261 (Kan. 1919) (holding that a letter asking, “Do you want to buy 240 good 100 lb. (1,000
lb.) cattle at 8.25 must be sold by Friday” was a mere inquiry). While not an offer, the
quoted language was clearly a commercial proposal.
136. Osborn, Offer as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 173.
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concerned with the raw number of recipients of a competitor’s communication
and more about whether the communication generates commercial interest in
an infringing product.
Advertisements and promotions should be defined as infringing offers
when they objectively appear likely to generate commercial interest in an
infringing product. As explained below, such a definition protects the patentee
from price erosion and lost sales and provides clarity to competitors.
1. An Objective “Commercialization” Test Protects Patentees From
Price Erosion and Provides Clarity to Competitors
When a business indicates to the relevant market an intent to compete
against a patent holder, the competing business potentially causes downward
price pressure on the patented goods, since the market expects the patentee to
lower its price to compete with the infringer.137 This downward price pressure,
often termed price erosion, harms the patentee by causing it to lose profits.138
The mechanism of price erosion demonstrates that the law should not be
greatly concerned simply with the number of recipients of a competitor’s
advertisement or promotion. A single communication evidencing an intent to
compete may result in significant price erosion if it is directed to an entity with
the ability to affect the market price of a patented good. For example, if an
entity represents the primary (or only) end-buyer of a patented good, then a
single solicitation to one of its high-level officers may result in price erosion.
This suggests that, at least in some contexts, a single letter or phone call might
constitute an advertisement or promotion.
On the other hand, if a competitor directs a single solicitation solely to an
entity representing only a small portion of the end-buyers of a patented good,
this is unlikely to cause much (if any) price erosion. The same could be true if a
competitor sends multiple promotions but the total audience nonetheless
represents only a small portion of the market. Should patent law exclude these
actions from the definition of an offer?
One option is for patent law to define an offer (including advertisements
and promotions) in terms of whether the communication causes harm. While
the definition makes sense in terms of the theory behind price erosion, it carries
with it significant uncertainty because calculating price erosion can be

137. See, e.g., Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1886); Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 791-92); Osborn, Offer
as a Policy Tool, supra note 4, at 174-75.
138. Several articles explore the concept of price erosion in more depth. See, e.g.,
David Bohrer et al., The Shifting Sands of Price Erosion: Price Erosion Damages Shift by
Tens of Millions of Dollars Depending Upon the Admissibility of Pre-Notice Eroded Prices,
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 723 (2009).
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complicated.139 Furthermore, patent law currently does not define an offer in
terms of harm, but rather in terms of whether it meets the requirements of a
contract-law offer.140 Not all contract-law offers will harm the patentee, such as
where the offer is to a small portion of the relevant market and the offer is not
accepted.
Instead of defining an offer in terms of whether it causes harm, a better
option is to define it objectively in terms of whether the offer amounts to an
apparent attempt to commercialize, regardless of the scale of the
commercialization. By “apparent attempt” I mean an objective, not subjective,
standard of whether the steps taken would appear to a reasonable person to be
an attempt to commercialize the technology. Under this definition, a single
promotion could constitute infringement, even if it did not cause provable price
erosion, as long as it appears from the circumstances to have generated
commercial interest in infringing technology. This test puts the initial onus on
the competitor to avoid commercializing infringing technology.
One may object to a commercialization test because it is over-inclusive
from the standpoint of harm to the patentee: first, as mentioned, the
communication may not have been widely distributed enough to cause price
erosion, and second, even if it had been more widely distributed, the market
may be structured such that price erosion would not have resulted.141 While
this is true, there is reason to believe that in many instances patentees will not
pursue infringement claims when they cannot prove harm because the
tremendous cost of litigation142 would deter them from bringing suit.143 At the
same time, the commercialization test respects the patent holder’s right to
exclude competitors.
Hence, an objective commercialization test gives a clearer rule than asking
139. See Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits
Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747, 759-60 (1994) (describing price erosion calculations and
stating that “[t]he interaction of elasticity of demand and claims for price erosion may be
confusing in some instances”); Gregory J. Werden et al., Economic Analysis of Lost Profits
from Patent Infringement With and Without Noninfringing Substitutes, 27 AIPLA Q.J. 305
passim (1999) (describing price erosion calculations in detail).
140. Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
141. For example, the patentee may not have had market power, perhaps because there
were acceptable non-infringing alternatives. In such a market, a widely distributed infringing
offer to sell will not cause price erosion. See Werden et al., supra note 139, at 315 (“The less
close a substitute the infringer’s product is for the patentee’s product, the less is the effect of
the infringement on the patentee’s price.”).
142. The average litigation cost to take a small patent infringement suit (less than
$1,000,000 at stake) through trial was almost $1,000,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-153 (2011).
143. Patent law provides for recovery of damages to “compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). A reasonable royalty
is calculated based on a hypothetical contractual negotiation that might have taken place
between the patentee and the infringer at a time just before infringement occurred. See RiteHite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Where there is no provable
harm to the patentee, the reasonable royalty should be very small.
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whether price erosion is likely to occur. This is not to say that the rule is crystal
clear; only that it is clearer than determining price erosion. While the test is
broad, and sometimes over-inclusive, it provides more clarity, which efficient
markets desire, and will force competitors to focus their efforts in areas other
than drafting clever promotions that avoid causing significant price erosion.
2. An Objective “Commercialization” Test Protects Patentees From
Lost Sales
In addition to harm from price erosion, a patentee who practices the
invention might be able to show harm from lost sales. Obviously, if the
infringing offer to sell culminated in an infringing sale, the patentee would
generally be able to show a lost sale. But circumstances may exist where the
competitor’s eventual sale does not infringe and yet the patentee may be able to
show a lost sale. The primary scenario for this kind of harm to the patentee is
when a competitor engages in a bait-and-switch tactic.144
In a patent infringement context, the “bait” occurs when a competitor
generates interest in an infringing technology without crossing the “offer”
threshold, whatever that threshold happens to be. Under current patent law,
since a general advertisement will not constitute infringement, a competitor can
advertise infringing technology. Once the competitor generates market interest
in the infringing technology, the competitor flips the “switch” by substituting
alternate non-infringing technology. If the purchaser decides to purchase from
the competitor despite the switch, it is likely that the patentee has lost a sale.
Some have questioned whether bait-and-switches would occur: since a
successful switch implies a non-infringing substitute, the competitor would
simply have offered the non-infringing substitute to begin with.145 But a baitand-switch scenario could occur in a market where the non-infringing substitute
is imperfect, i.e., it is good but not as good as the patented technology. In this
situation, the patented technology may be the attention-grabbing, state-of-theart product that generates interest from purchasers.
Still, one might ask how a bait-and-switch could occur with an imperfect
substitute—wouldn’t the buyer simply leave and seek out the patentee’s
superior product? Not necessarily. Several factors relating to information and
transaction costs may contribute to the customer staying with the competitor,
such as where relationships between the buyer and seller are important, where
144. See Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(upholding a jury verdict that characterized defendant’s offering to sell an infringing device
but subsequently completing the sale with a non-infringing device as a bait-and-switch);
Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Corp., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1792, 1795 (W.D. Wis. 1997)
(“[B]efore offers to sell were included in Section 271(a), a third party could employ ‘bait and
switch’ tactics by offering for sale a patented invention and then switching the offered design
to a non-infringing one before the sale was complete.”).
145. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 795 n.273.
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the buyer has already expended considerable transaction costs with the
competitor and is unwilling to start over, and where information costs are high
such that the competitor is unaware of the patentee.
Where information and transaction costs will cause some buyers to stay
with a competitor even after it pulls the switch, competitors will sometimes
divert a percentage of sales from the patentee. Such diverted sales contravene
the policy of preventing a competitor from generating commercial interest in
infringing technology to the detriment of the patentee. Hence, patent law
should protect patentees against this type of activity.
A commercialization test would deter bait-and-switch scenarios by
subjecting the competitor to an infringement suit based on the advertisement or
promotions that generates the commercial interest. Obviously, if the “bait” (i.e.,
the advertisement or promotion) itself is actionable as infringement, the
competitor will be unlikely to engage in the behavior. Further, under the
objective test, the competitor cannot defend on the grounds that it subjectively
never intended to infringe because its subjective intent is not determinative.
It might be argued, however, that patentees may be protected against
intentional146 bait-and-switch tactics through laws prohibiting false advertising.
For example, the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) prohibits any
“false advertisement,” which it defines as “an advertisement . . . which is
misleading in a material respect.”147 Although apparently never litigated in the
context of patent infringement, engaging in bait-and-switch advertising fits
squarely within the FTC Act’s prohibition against false advertising.148
In addition, any advertisement to sell a product that the advertiser knows
may infringe a patent may constitute false advertising if the advertiser does not
disclose the risk of infringement. In determining whether an advertisement is
misleading under the FTC Act, courts shall consider “the extent to which the
advertisement fails to reveal facts . . . [that are] material with respect to
consequences which may result from the use of the [advertised product].”149
Since a buyer who uses an infringing product in the United States commits
patent infringement,150 the buyer would be subject to patent infringement
damages. Such damages would appear to fall under the natural meaning of the
146. A competitor may engage in an intentional bait-and-switch (as where the
competitor never intended to sell the first-offered technology) or an unintentional bait-andswitch (as where the competitor modifies the offered technology after discovering, or in
good faith more closely analyzing, a problematic patent).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2012).
148. 16 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2006) (“No advertisement containing an offer to sell a product
should be published when the offer is not a bona fide effort to sell the advertised product.”).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (making the use of an infringing product within the
United States an act of infringement). If the eventual contemplated sale were to occur
outside the United States or for use outside the United States, materiality under the FTC Act
would likely depend in part on whether the use would infringe in the country where the sale
or use would occur.
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phrase “material” consequences.
The FTC Act, however, may not provide adequate protection to patentees,
because it does not create a private cause of action, but instead only empowers
the FTC to bring actions.151 The FTC may decide not to bring a suit for a
variety of reasons, including limitations on resources and broader public
interest concerns.152 Further, since the focus of the FTC Act is on the consumer
and not the patentee, even if a suit is brought, patentees will not receive a
remedy.
Besides the federal FTC Act, various state laws may provide patentees
some protection against bait-and-switch tactics. Each state has adopted similar
statutes called “little FTC acts” and has adopted other consumer protection
measures to prohibit other unfair or deceptive practices.153 Unlike the federal
FTC Act, many state acts give injured consumers the power to sue merchants
who violate the statute and some provide for treble damages, punitive damages,
minimum damages, and/or the award of attorney’s fees to successful consumer
plaintiffs.154 While the state acts may disincentivize parties from engaging in
bait-and-switch tactics, many allow only consumers to sue, as opposed to
competitors (i.e., patentees) and thus do not adequately protect the patentee’s
interests.155 Other state statutes, however, have been construed to allow
competitors to sue.156 In such states, a patentee may have some protection
against intentional bait-and-switch tactics but would be required to prove: (1)
that the competitor’s communication constituted an “advertisement” under the
state statute and (2) that the competitor had deceptive intent. Both of these
proofs may be difficult.
In addition to the federal FTC Act and the various state actions, section 43

151. See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 441 n.21 (1991) (citing
cases for this proposition).
152. Id. at 441-43.
153. Id. at 446-52; see also Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011); Stewart Macaulay,
Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575,
582-89 (1989).
154. Sovern, supra note 151, at 448.
155. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.025.1 (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1345.02(a) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1(5)(M) (2006); see also David L. Belt,
The Standard for Determining “Unfair Acts or Practices” Under State Unfair Trade
Practices Acts, 80 CONN. B.J. 247, 310-311 (2006) (discussing who has standing to sue
under various state deceptive practices acts).
156. See, e.g., Harrington Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 248 S.E.2d 739, 742 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding that North Carolina’s deceptive trade practices act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1(a), allows suits by competitors as well as consumers); see also Matthew W.
Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness In “Unfair Trade Practices”, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 2033, 2078 n.242 (2012) (noting competitor-based suits under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 751.1(a)).
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of the Lanham Act may provide patentees additional protection against baitand-switch tactics. The Lanham Act prohibits a “false or misleading
representation of fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”157
Competitors can bring actions under the Lanham Act.158 Though it has
apparently never been litigated, it would appear that if a patentee could prove
the competitor intentionally used bait-and-switch tactic and never intended to
sell the infringing article, the patentee could bring a false advertising claim.
Even if a patentee could convince a court to apply the Lanham Act in this novel
manner, the patentee would still be put to the difficult process of proving a
competitor’s deceptive intent. In addition, the competitor’s activity would have
to fit into the Lanham Act’s somewhat amorphous definition of “advertising or
promotion.”159
In sum, federal and state false advertising laws may not adequately protect
patentees against intentional bait-and-switch tactics that use advertisements or
promotions of infringing technology as the bait. Further, they would not appear
to protect the patentee against unintentional bait-and-switch activities, even
though such activities could divert sales from the patentee. Therefore, patent
law could better protect patent holders by adopting an objective
commercialization test.
This Subpart has discussed protecting patentees from the harms associated
with price erosion and lost sales. The next Subpart shifts the focus to tailoring
the definition of an offer so as to protect competitors that engage in beneficial
competitive activity.
C. Patent Law’s Definition of an “Offer” Should Allow Good-Faith
Market Inquiry by Competitors
While the test for an offer in patent infringement law should encompass
advertisements and promotions broadly defined, the law should leave room for
competitors to explore whether it would be profitable either to obtain a license
from the patent holder or to develop competing, but non-infringing technology.
Purposefully configuring technology that avoids patent infringement is known
as “designing around” a patent. The Federal Circuit160 and writers161 endorse

157. Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
158. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100,

1103-04 (8th Cir. 2006); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914
(3d Cir. 1990).
159. See supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 F.3d 1335,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that designing around patented technology is something “that
patent law encourages”); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to
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the practice of designing around patents in part because it disseminates
technology and encourages further innovation—by studying a patent or
patented technology, a competitor can devise improvements, simplifications, or
other modifications more cheaply than without the knowledge acquired from
the patented item.
Since the design-around process can benefit society, the law should be
careful not to define an infringing “offer” so broadly as to unnecessarily chill
commercial activity that would legitimately compete with the patented
technology.162 The law should not permit a competitor to commercialize
infringing technology, but it should permit the competitor to gauge the market
demand for technology similar to the infringing technology, as long as the
competitor makes clear that it will not purposefully commercialize infringing
technology. Competitors will generally need knowledge of market demand
before deciding whether to invest resources in developing design-around
technology. If competitors cannot gauge market demand, they will forego
investing in design-around technology and society will be worse off.163
To break this impasse, the law should be clear that a competitor cannot
promote infringing technology, but should allow a competitor to tell the
market, in effect, “we hope to create technology that does not infringe but that
accomplishes the same result as the patented technology.” As long as the
competitor is clear that it has no intent to offer infringing technology, the law
should permit it to gauge marketability without having to spell out the details of
its (yet-to-be-developed) design-around technology.
It is true that even where a competitor is clear that it intends to develop
non-infringing (design-around) technology, such market testing may sometimes
cause price erosion. Suppose for example that the competitor is a company
known for its ingenuity and ability to design around patented technology. Such
a company’s mere announcement that it intends to design-around a patent may
lead the market to believe the item is forthcoming and thus lower the price the
patentee can charge. Even so, such price erosion should not be actionable
‘design around’ a competitor’s [patented] products, . . . thus bringing a steady flow of
innovations to the marketplace.”).
161. See, e.g., Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2001) (“[T]hose who invent new devices by intentionally designing
around a patent nonetheless advance the public welfare and fulfill the purpose of the Patent
Clause.”); Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1434 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 S.M.U. L.
REV. 123 (2006); Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around A United States
Patent, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 647 (2004).
162. See Holbrook, Threat of a Sale, supra note 4, at 779 (“An overly broad definition
of offer to sell infringement could have a chilling effect on competitors, particularly attempts
to design around the patent. If something short of a commercial offer could constitute
infringement, a competitor’s ability to assess the marketability of a device would be limited
and would risk earlier exposure to an infringement suit.”).
163. Note that defining “offer” so broadly as to preclude market assessment might
impermissibly restrict free speech. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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because the harm to the patentee is not from an expected infringement, but
rather from an expected non-infringing activity.
All of this may seem overly complex to those unfamiliar with patent law.
One might wonder: if the competitor’s technology is going to be noninfringing, then it should not matter whether the competitor “offers” it for
sale—exposure to liability will depend on whether the device infringes or not.
In essence, this discussion might appear to conflate the issue of offer with the
issue of infringement. The conflation of offer and infringement is justifiable,
however, because despite competitors’ desire to predict accurately whether
their technology will infringe, they find predicting infringement difficult.164
To develop non-infringing technology, the competitor must guess how a
court will construe a patent’s claims and then determine a technological
solution that avoids the claims while delivering the same or a similar result.165
But construing patent claims is famously difficult.166 The ex ante uncertainty
regarding whether a given technology infringes a patent’s claims can be
heightened by the unpredictable application of the doctrine of equivalents,
which states that even if the accused technology does not literally meet the
requirements of the patent claims, it may be “equivalent.”167 To make matters
worse, the law regarding the doctrine of equivalents is in a state of flux.168
164. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that patent law is an area “where ultimate outcomes are difficult to predict”); Colleen V.
Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 285 (2011) (“It is popular to
characterize patent litigation as uncertain and unpredictable.”).
165. Literal infringement of a patent claim requires that the accused technology contain
each and every limitation of the patent claim. E.g., Enercon GmbH v. ITC, 151 F.3d 1376,
1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
166. The test for infringement, while easily stated, masks great uncertainty in part
because the metes and bounds of each patent claim are not known until a court construes
them, a process that is notoriously unpredictable. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231,
233 (2005) (reporting the reversal rate for appealed claim terms from 1996 to 2003 was
34.5%); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001) (“[D]istrict court judges improperly construe patent claim
terms in 33% of the cases appealed to the Federal Circuit.”); David L. Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases,
107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008).
167. Under the doctrine of equivalents, the “scope of a patent is not limited to its literal
terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described” to prevent competitors
from avoiding infringement by making unimportant and insubstantial differences to their
technology. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002). The doctrine of equivalents “renders the scope of patents less certain.” Id.
168. Commentators have explored the doctrine of equivalents at length. See, e.g., John
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59
STAN. L. REV. 955, 962-63 (2007); Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent
Attorneys in Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 123 (2000); Lee
Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371
(2010); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
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Because the issue of infringement is unpredictable, competitors should be
free to explore the marketability of competing technology without exposure to
patent infringement lawsuits. The law can give this freedom by defining an
offer so as to exclude market-testing activity by competitors as long as it makes
clear it intends to develop a non-infringing design-around. This will give
competitors some breathing room to explore the market without generating
expensive litigation. Only if the market indicates a receptiveness to designaround technology will the competitor need to decide whether to invest in
trying to develop specific designs. By permitting relatively inexpensive market
testing, the law allows competitors to devote more resources to developing the
actual design-around technology.
The protection of early-stage market testing should cease, however, when
the competitor indicates a present intent to commercialize a specific design.
Once the competitor attempts to commercialize a specific design (as opposed to
a generic and yet-to-be-developed design-around design), it should be open to
an infringement suit that considers the specific design being commercialized.
By exposing the competitor to patent infringement liability, the law will
protect the patentee from price erosion and will force the competitor to think
hard before commercializing a specific design. Before the competitor
commercializes the specific design-around technology, it should wisely expend
resources analyzing the patent to determine (as best it can) whether its design
will infringe or not. Depending on its infringement analysis, the competitor
may decide to further tweak its design to avoid infringement or to give up on
the design-around and approach the patentee for a license. But all this will be
done before advertisement-based price erosion harms the patentee.
In summary, to encourage beneficial design-around technology, the law
should define an offer to permit free but careful assessment of the market for
design-around technology without fear of litigation. This will allow more
resources first to assess the market and later to attempt to develop the specific
design-around. Only if and after the competitor develops specific designs
should it incur the costs of ascertaining the threat of patent infringement
liability. But to be fair to the patentee, the competitor should be exposed to
patent infringement liability once it commercializes one or more specific
designs. The law can accomplish all these objectives while including
“advertisements” and other “promotions” within the definition of an infringing
offer.
V.

EFFECTS FARTHER AFIELD

This Section briefly highlights a few more impacts of including
advertisement and promotions in § 271(a)’s definition of an offer to emphasize

Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 234-37 (2002).
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the numerous downstream consequences of the law change.169
A. Possible Liability for Third Party Intermediaries Such As Advertising
Agencies
Making the action of running an advertisement an act of infringement
raises a question of who is liable for the advertisement (assuming it infringes).
For simplicity, I identify two potential actors: the technology company that will
eventually sell the technology and the advertising agency that helps design and
distribute the advertisement.170 In a basic scenario, the technology company
will hire the advertising agency, but the technology company will supply the
technical information included in the advertisement. Should only the
technology be liable for patent infringement? Only the advertising agency? Or
both?
If one defines the act of advertising to constitute infringement, an
advertising agency would literally be liable as an infringer, just as a third party
distributor is liable for “selling” items on behalf of a wholesaler. This would
obviously be an unfortunate situation for advertisers, because direct
infringement does not require intent or knowledge.171 While advertising
intermediaries could contract for indemnification against infringement, I think
the better solution is to define the infringing “advertiser” exclusively as the
underlying technology company that requests the advertisement. Holding
advertising agencies and other intermediaries liable would either dramatically
chill or significantly increase the costs of advertising for all technology, since
the intermediary cannot be sure in advance what might infringe. To avoid these
costs, advertising intermediaries should be exempt from direct infringement for
advertisements created for or designed on behalf of third parties.
In addition to direct infringement, patent law imposes liability for inducing
infringement and contributory infringement.172 Outside the patent law context,
contributory infringement has a broader definition,173 but Congress defined
contributory infringement in patent law narrowly to involve the supply of a
169. The potential effects are legion. Broadening the definition of an “offer” under
§ 271(a) to include advertisements might cause a similar broadening of the definition of “on
sale” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (superseded by 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (effective Mar.
16, 2013)), setting off a whole new set of ripple effects.
170. Of course, a company may design and distribute its own advertisement without
using an agency. In addition, more than one intermediary may be involved, for example a
magazine publisher or an Internet service provider. My conclusions regarding the advertising
agency would apply generally to other intermediaries.
171. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
172. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)-(c) (2012).
173. See Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory
Liability in Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513, 513 (2009) (“Contributory
liability [traditionally] applied if a defendant had knowledge of infringement by another and
materially contributed to the infringement.”).
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component or other product that can be used to infringe a patent.174 Advertising
agencies do not supply components so they will not be liable as contributory
infringers. This may be a good thing for advertisers and other intermediaries
who are often accused of contributory infringement under trademark and
copyright law.175
Induced infringement, unlike direct infringement, requires the accused
inducer to have knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement.176 Knowledge can include direct knowledge of infringement or
“willful blindness,” which the Supreme Court defines as having two
requirements: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions
to avoid learning of that fact.”177 Hence, under an inducement theory, an
advertising agency might be liable if it knew or was willfully blind to the fact
that the advertisement it ran constituted infringement.
In addition to the knowledge requirement, induced infringement requires
“inducement.” Although in common terminology inducement means to cause a
person to do something he otherwise would not have done, it is not clear that
patent law’s definition is so narrow.178 It is possible, though not clear, that
“inducing” might include anything a defendant does to help a third party
infringe.179 If courts understand “inducement” under the broadest definition,
advertising agencies could be liable because they literally help the
infringement. But under any narrower definition, an advertising agency is
unlikely to be liable even if it knew of the infringement, because advertising
agencies are unlikely to attempt to get others to infringe. Though neither the
Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit has settled this issue, the most recent en
banc Federal Circuit opinion on the issue indicates that “inducement” connotes
a situation where a third party advises or encourages others to engage in
infringing conduct.180 If this is true, advertising agencies and other third party
174. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.”).
175. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077-1079 (9th Cir. 2004)
(copyright case involving an Internet service provider); Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 463, 501-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (trademark case involving an online retailer); Gillette
Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 662, 663-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Lanham Act false
advertising case involving an advertising agency).
176. Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
177. Id. at 2068-71.
178. Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 22829 (2005).
179. Id. at 229.
180. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed.
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intermediaries can breathe easier.
B. Increased Incentives to Innovate
Including advertisements within the definition of an offer may increase net
incentives to innovate. As we have seen, advertisements of infringing
technology can lead to price erosion, thus harming patentees.181 Under the
current standard of an offer under § 271(a), patentees have no remedy against
advertisement-induced price erosion.182 Patent theory suggests that the more
patent holders can profit from their patents (including by suing infringers), the
more incentive and ability they have to innovate and commercialize their
technology.183
Because patentees currently have no remedy for the harm of advertisementinduced price erosion, they profit less than they would under a broader
definition of an offer. Accordingly, people and businesses will innovate and
commercialize less than if they could seek a remedy for advertisement-induced
price erosion. I do not mean to suggest that broadening the definition of an
offer to include advertisements will result in a dramatic increase in incentives
to innovate or commercialize technology. Rather, the effect is at the margins.
C. First Amendment Concerns from Regulating Commercial Speech
The First Amendment protects commercial speech that “does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.”184 Contract-law offers and advertisements
are forms of commercial speech, and thus this Subpart analyzes how the First
Amendment impacts the definition of an offer under § 271(a).
Traditionally, the First Amendment did not protect commercial speech but
rather focused on other forms of speech such as political speech.185 Beginning
in the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court began to protect commercial
speech, noting that the free flow of commercial information is “indispensable”
to the public so that its private economic decisions in a free enterprise economy
Cir. 2012) (“[S]ection 271(b) extends liability to a party who advises, encourages, or
otherwise induces others to engage in infringing conduct . . . .”). Of course, the phrase
“otherwise induces” renders the meaning uncertain, but the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (“it
is known by its associates”) suggests that “induces” connotes advisement and
encouragement.
181. Supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
183. E.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2001).
184. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
776 (1976).
185. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear
that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising.”).
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will be “intelligent and well informed.”186
1. Restricting the Definition of an Offer
While the First Amendment may generally protect commercial speech, it
does not prevent Congress from outlawing advertisements of infringing
technology. The First Amendment does not protect commercial speech that
advertises illegal activities.187 Because patent law makes “selling” a device that
infringes a patent an unlawful act,188 an advertisement or other offer to sell an
infringing device is an advertisement/offer for an illegal activity;189 thus, the
advertisement/offer is not protected by the First Amendment.190 This is true
whether one defines an offer as a formal, contract-law offer or as an
advertisement/promotion, because both generally constitute commercial speech
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.191 Broadening the
definition of an offer to include advertisements and promotions would
obviously increase the amount of protected speech, but it would not run afoul
of the First Amendment.
Importantly, however, the First Amendment might limit how broadly
courts can interpret the term “offer.” Courts could not define an offer to sell so
186. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
187. Id. at 770-72 (listing categories of commercial speech regulation that “are surely

permissible,” including regulating “advertisements [that] are themselves illegal in any
way.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 56364 (1980) (“The government may ban . . . commercial speech related to illegal
activity . . . .”) (citations omitted); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (“For commercial speech
to [be protected by the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity . . . .”).
188. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority . . . sells any patented
invention, within the United States, . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.”).
189. There is one scenario where a court might have the power to restrain the “offer”
but not the “sale,” and that is when an “offer” is made in the United States, but the eventual
sale would be consummated outside of the United States. If such an offer were held to
infringe, it would not be an offer for illegal activity, and the restriction would need to be
analyzed under the Supreme Court’s commercial speech test set forth in Central Hudson.
The most recent Federal Circuit interpretation of infringement for an “offer to sell,”
however, found that offers in the United States for sales abroad would not infringe; rather,
offers made abroad for sales that would be in the United States do infringe. See Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The focus should not be on the location of the offer, but rather the location
of the future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer.”).
190. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The
Clash Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic
Perspective, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 36 (2001); Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE
L.J. 147, 234 (1998).
191. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (noting that
the “core notion of commercial speech” is “speech which does no more than propose a
commercial transaction”) (quotations and citations omitted).
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broadly as to include mere market investigation (e.g., to discern whether to take
a license from the patentee or to try to design around the patent), because such
speech is far removed from selling an infringing device.192
2. Restricting Preliminary Restraints
In addition to restrictions on the definition of an offer, the First
Amendment may also restrict whether and to what extent courts can
preliminarily enjoin offers to sell allegedly infringing devices. Preliminary
injunctions193 against offers and advertisements constitute a “prior restraint” on
speech, which is defined as a “governmental restriction on speech or
publication before its actual expression.”194 The First Amendment strongly
disfavors prior restraints.195 It is not that speech can never be restrained before
its utterance, but the presumption against prior restraint is most forceful when,
as in the case of preliminary relief, the law abridges “expression prior to a full
and fair determination of the constitutionally protected nature of the expression
by an independent judicial forum.”196 As Professor Redish argues, a full and
fair judicial assessment of the accused speech is the touchstone for whether
restraint is permissible.197
In patent law, preliminary restraints against offers to sell allegedly
infringing devices implicate prior restraint concerns: not only must a court
make a determination that the speech is commercial (likely an easy
determination), but also it must determine that the offer is to sell a device that is
actually infringing. As discussed above, determining infringement is extremely
difficult; it often involves ambitious study of the technology involved, the
patent’s claims, the patent’s validity, and an analysis of whether the accused
device infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.198 If the device offered for
sale does not infringe the patent, then no justification for restraining the speech
exists. Yet in many cases a court is not likely to know whether the device
192. Hence, it happens by chance that First Amendment concerns suggest a definition
of offer that is consistent with the definition that would encourage design-around
technology: one that permits investigation into market conditions. See supra notes 162-163
and accompanying text.
193. This Article refers to “preliminary injunctions,” but the analysis is the same for
temporary restraining orders. Permanent injunctions do not raise the same concern because
at that stage a court can adequately assess all infringement aspects as discussed infra note
197 and accompanying text.
194. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1833 (9th ed. 2009).
195. E.g., Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (“Any prior
restraint on expression comes to this Court with a ‘heavy presumption’ against its
constitutional validity.”) (citations omitted).
196. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (1984).
197. See generally id.; see also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 190, at 169-98 (analyzing
the First Amendment’s implications for preliminary relief in the copyright context).
198. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
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infringes until it has devoted much time to the inquiry, making preliminary
injunctions against offers to sell infringing devices suspect under the First
Amendment.199
While the constitutional arguments against preliminary restrictions of
offers to sell infringing devices suggest courts should be cautious in granting
them, some have suggested that they may have little practical impact:
Professors Lemley and Volokh argue that because patent law makes “selling”
an infringing device an act of infringement, and “selling” is not speech and thus
not protected by the First Amendment, a court could enjoin the sale of the
device, making many offers for sale futile.200 This is generally true, but it
ignores the potential harm from price erosion.201
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, the First Amendment will prevent courts or Congress from
defining the term “offer” so broadly as to include mere market investigations,
but will not prevent a definition that includes advertisements and similar
promotions. In addition, at the margins, the First Amendment will prevent a
court from preliminarily restricting an advertisement or other offer unless and
until the court determines whether the device offered actually infringes the
patent.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS
This Article has demonstrated how a relatively small change in the law—
broadening the definition of an “offer” in § 271(a) of the Patent Act—can have
far-reaching effects. The change will lead to more and earlier patent litigation
(Part II), more extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law (Part III), a need
for clear boundaries for the new definition of an offer (Part IV), and additional
ripple effects such as third-party liability and free speech concerns (Part V).
In addition to exploring these effects carefully, this Article demonstrated
how courts should manage the change by providing an optimal definition of an
offer and a test for when such offers should bring about liability in the United
States. Thus, for example, an “offer” should include advertisements and
smaller-scale promotions, but should not include mere market investigations
that make clear the investigating company will not commercialize an infringing
199. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 190, at 34-39; Lemley & Volokh, supra note
190, at 234.
200. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 190, at 234. But see supra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text (noting that the location of the offer is not determinative).
201. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (discussing price erosion). A fully
informed market would likely not react with downward price pressure based on an
advertisement where the future sale was impossible (enjoined). But in some circumstances at
least, the market will not be perfectly informed.
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device.202 Further, the test for what constitutes advertisements and promotions
should be guided by an “objective commercialization” test, which asks not
whether the promotion is sent to a certain number of people, but rather whether
it would appear to a reasonable person as an attempt to commercialize
infringing technology.203 These tests protect a U.S. patent holder from price
erosion without needlessly chilling the development of design-around
technology204 and without violating the First Amendment.205
To address concerns about unfair applications of U.S. patent law to foreign
actors (e.g., non-U.S. persons advertising infringing technology), this Article
recommends a multi-factor “total context test,” which considers mainly
objective indicia of whether the advertisement contemplates future sales in the
United States.206 Additionally, this Article recommends that courts utilize
personal jurisdiction doctrines to limit unfair extraterritorial applications of the
law.207
Taken together, these recommendations allow the law governing infringing
offers to sell to fulfill its primary policy objective, which is preventing
commercialization of infringing technology to the commercial detriment of the
patentee,208 without unnecessarily trampling on other rights or policies.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Part IV.
Part IV.B.
Part IV.C.
Part V.C.
Part III.A.
Part III.B.
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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